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Abstract
This article describes recent events in the governance of 
standard-setting for 2 areas of US health policy — states’ 
decisions about which prescription drugs to cover under 
Medicaid and other public programs and making health 
an aspect of foreign policy — and whether these events 
offer lessons for policy making. In prescription drug cov-
erage, methodologic advances in research that evaluates 
health services and the politics of restraining the rate of 
growth in health expenditures enabled policy makers in 
most states to establish new public processes for assessing 
and applying evidence about the effectiveness of compet-
ing drugs. Their counterparts in foreign policy, in contrast, 
made few changes in existing processes for choosing which 
interventions to support. The history of governance in each 
area of policy making for health explains the selection of 
standards to evaluate evidence about interventions and 
whether and how to use this evidence to guide policy.
Introduction
Government leaders at every level choose among alterna-
tive policies mainly as a result of governance. Researchers 
in the policy sciences (eg, history, politics, economics, law) 
describe governance as encompassing the complex rela-
tionships among people and organizations that influence 
the making and implementing of policy. Understanding 
governance requires analysis of the authority and account-
ability embodied in constitutions, laws, and regulations; the 
politics of professional, commercial, and advocacy groups; 
and the shaping of public opinion. Moreover, ideas and 
beliefs — some contested, others consensual — influence 
the governance of each area of policy. In sum, governance 
is the source of the “power to make, the willingness to obey, 
and the decisions to contest rules and commands” (1).
This article describes, compares, and seeks lessons from 
the effects on standard-setting of recent changes in the 
governance of health care policy in the states and of health 
as an aspect of American foreign policy. During the past 
decade, almost all of the states established public pro-
cesses to set standards for evaluating research findings on 
the effectiveness of pharmaceutical drugs, for adjudicating 
competing claims about the strength of the evidence for 
these findings, and for advising about or, in some jurisdic-
tions, recommending policy. In contrast, the events that 
raised the priority accorded to health as an aspect of for-
eign policy did not establish new processes that set stan-
dards for how the best available evidence would inform 
policy. As a result, the conventional governance of foreign 
policy set standards for which determinants of health to 
address and with what interventions.
History of the Governance of Population 
Health
Governance and the delegation of authority
Until recently, the governance of most countries’ juris-
dictions resulted in the authority for setting standards 
for health policy being split among different influential 
groups. Public officials set standards for investigating, 
measuring, and, if possible, acting to reduce the incidence 
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and prevalence of disease and improve the safety of 
patients in clinical facilities. In each country, governance 
determined the influence of the best available research 
and lobbying by commercial, professional, and reformist 
interest groups on these standards.
Governance in most countries resulted in authority for 
science being delegated to communities of researchers. 
Researchers usually dominated the prioritization of sub-
jects for investigation and set standards for methodology 
and evidence. They governed science through professional 
associations, national academies and colleges, universi-
ties, foundations, and government funding agencies. 
Governance also resulted in authority being delegated 
to the health professions. For centuries, physicians have 
had legal authority to license, certify, credential, and 
discipline their colleagues. As a result of this authority, 
they acquired substantial autonomy beyond what had 
been legally granted to them to set and enforce standards 
for care. Physicians tenaciously protected this autonomy 
when, during the 20th century, governments delegated 
more limited authority to other health professions to 
license and discipline their members.
However, governance could not divide authority to make 
and implement policy to address determinants of health 
that involved physical infrastructure, personal behavior, 
and socioeconomic conditions. For example, since the 19th 
century, coalitions in the United States and other coun-
tries supported the allocation of considerable tax revenue 
for sewerage and the chlorination and filtration of water. 
By the early 20th century, investment in technologies to 
produce clean water was “responsible for nearly half the 
total mortality reduction, three quarters of the infant mor-
tality reduction, and nearly two thirds of the child mortal-
ity reduction [in] major American cities” (2).
Innovations in governance
Other innovations in public health policy occurred as 
a result of governance that involved public agencies, the 
medical profession, and leaders of business, philanthropy, 
and labor. For example, international collaboration among 
researchers and public officials to define diseases in order 
to report and quantify cases began in the 1850s. By the 
end of that decade, William Farr, a British health official, 
had devised a “model healthy population to serve as a 
standard” for calculating excess mortality among health 
districts (3). By the 1980s this concept, elaborated, had 
become the basis of the European Community Atlas of 
“Avoidable Death” (4).
By allocating resources to address other determinants 
of population health, governance facilitated the imple-
mentation of health care policy. Beginning in the 1850s, 
for instance, William Farr collaborated with Florence 
Nightingale in achieving policy to measure excess deaths 
in public and charitable hospitals. Then they acquired 
resources to evaluate interventions to reduce excess mor-
tality by intervening in both the care of patients and the 
management of hospital environments (5). Efforts con-
tinue to persuade policy makers to link interventions with 
individuals and with populations. For example, a recent 
US study of avoidable deaths found that “health improve-
ment requires investment in . . . health care, behavioral 
change, and socioeconomic factors” (6).
Addressing multiple determinants of health in governance
Governance also has been mobilized to address multiple 
determinants of health. One of the earliest examples of 
this mobilization occurred in New York City in the 1890s 
when public health officials proposed mandatory report-
ing of tuberculosis, which the medical profession strongly 
opposed. Then the city’s political machine, Tammany 
Hall, along with leaders of business and philanthropy who 
usually opposed Tammany, endorsed mandatory report-
ing (7). Another example of the mobilization of governance 
to address multiple determinants of health occurred in 
many low- and middle-income countries from the 1920s 
through the 1960s. Public officials in these countries, 
often collaborating with leaders in business, labor, reli-
gion, and philanthropy, prioritized investment in raising 
standards for education and public health rather than for 
health care (8).
Governance in industrial countries frequently results in 
the prioritization of determinants of health other than care 
during crises. Until the mid-19th century, for instance, 
hunger and its effects were not problems of governance. 
Prevailing belief ascribed hunger to individual misbehav-
ior or inexorable natural forces. Governance then rede-
fined hunger as a problem caused by economic, social, and 
political circumstances. By the 1920s, scientific advances 
distinguished starvation from malnutrition, and policy 
emerged to address both conditions. During World War II, 
a British official described the effects of public, civic, and 
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private activities to prevent starvation and malnutrition. 
He reported that the “people of this country are actually 
better fed today from the point of view of health than they 
were before the war” (9).
In each of the examples above, participants in governance 
had incentives to address determinants of population 
health. Healthier voters enhanced Tammany’s political 
capital and were more productive employees. Policy mak-
ers and their allies in low- and middle-income countries 
built schools and educated their citizens about manag-
ing health risks, in large part because they had fewer 
resources than their counterparts in industrial countries. 
The governance of wartime Britain strongly endorsed 
food policy that maintained a productive workforce and 
contained class conflict.
Precedents also exist for standards that address mul-
tiple determinants of health in the governance of foreign 
policy. During the 1930s the League of Nations Health 
Organization promoted science-based standards for nutri-
tional policy, usually collaborating with external scien-
tific, professional, and philanthropic organizations. In the 
1950s, leaders of philanthropic foundations and public 
officials in the United States collaborated to expand the 
scope of foreign policy to include aid for family planning in 
low-income countries.
The Conventional Politics of Setting 
Standards for Health
In each of these examples, research findings on popula-
tion health informed governance through conventional 
political processes. Researchers, physicians and other 
health professionals, advocates for patients, and lobby-
ists for commercial interest groups published studies and 
polemics, informed journalists, testified to legislative com-
mittees, visited policy makers, and contributed to their 
campaigns. Officials of national and subnational govern-
ments, multinational public organizations, philanthropies, 
and advocacy groups issued reports and promoted policies 
to set and raise standards for health.
Unanticipated consequences of these conventional mech-
anisms of governance impeded making policy to improve 
population health. Elected officials have had grounds 
for skepticism about scientific advice given to them by 
patients’ advocates, workers, members of racial and eth-
nic minority groups, and even charitable organizations, 
as well as from lobbyists for commercial and professional 
organizations. Policy makers have, for instance, often dis-
trusted advice from career scientists within government 
because these civil servants have frequently collaborated 
with (and subsequently became employees of) advocacy 
and industrial organizations that interpreted scientific 
evidence in ways that promoted their self-interest (10).
Changes in Governance
Advances in research and evaluation methods
Despite interest-group lobbying and the skepticism of 
policy makers, science that met international standards of 
excellence has frequently been effective in the governance 
of population health policy. Examples include regulating 
lead in gasoline and paint, asbestos in building materials, 
and vinyl chloride as an industrial chemical (11) and limit-
ing exposure to secondhand tobacco smoke in public places 
and workplaces. In each of these instances, findings from 
research that was independent of commercial or ideological 
influence helped government officials persuade colleagues 
and constituents to support new regulations, even when 
these policies adversely affected the earnings of corpora-
tions and individuals and restricted personal liberty.
Advances in methods for evaluating the effectiveness 
of health services have influenced governance around the 
world since the early 1990s. These methods enabled policy 
makers to challenge assertions about what services to 
pay for that were based mainly on claims of authority by 
medical professionals and sometimes on questionable evi-
dence promoted by commercial and advocacy groups. The 
most prominent example of this influence of research on 
governance is the methodology of research synthesis and 
its use to conduct systematic reviews of the effectiveness 
of prescription drugs, medical devices, care processes, and 
public health interventions. Authors of systematic reviews 
who accept international standards exclude the weakest 
and most biased primary studies and conduct meta-analy-
ses to minimize bias in studies they select for synthesis. 
The number of systematic reviews published each year in 
the international literature recently increased from 87 in 
1988 to an average of 2,500 in 2005 (12).
Methodologic advances that have increasing influence 
on governance also occurred in other disciplines in recent 
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decades. New methods for measuring and improving 
the quality of health care, work that was subsequently 
labeled quality science, evolved from the study of indus-
trial processes in the general economy and from general 
and clinical epidemiology. Advances in the methods of 
economics increased the persuasiveness of cost-effective-
ness analysis and created new approaches to studying 
social well-being and analyzing different forms of organi-
zational governance. Similarly, advances in the methods 
of political science, sociology, and historical epidemiology 
generated findings that interest some key participants 
in governance; for example, quantifying the relationship 
between changes in health care infrastructure and health 
status, educational attainment, and even the stability of 
regimes in low-income countries.
The new governance of evidence-informed standards
Recent innovations in the governance of health care in 
most industrial countries are assisting policy makers to 
counter pressure from interest and advocacy groups in 
new ways. Policy makers have established organizations 
— sometimes called agencies, commissions, committees, 
councils, or institutes, but which will be called review 
organizations hereafter — that commission, conduct, and 
report on independent research that evaluates interven-
tions. These organizations usually recommend policy or 
issue guidance that has the force of law. The first review 
organizations assessed new interventions, especially those 
involving drugs and devices, but their scope is steadily 
expanding. Review organizations are led by experts in 
health research, policy, and clinical practice or appoint 
such experts to advisory groups (13).
Staff of these organizations often share experience 
across national and subjurisdictional boundaries. As a 
result of these exchanges, most of the organizations are 
applying internationally accepted standards for methods 
to evaluate drugs, devices, and care processes. Research 
from one country often supports a report under attack in 
another.
Review organizations dealing with the governance of 
health care have antagonists. Manufacturers of drugs and 
devices, the research and advocacy groups they finance, 
and some associations of medical specialists frequently 
challenge public and quasi-public organizations that eval-
uate health services. These critics often deplore decisions 
that limit coverage to the most effective interventions. 
Many insist that analysis of cost-effectiveness masks deci-
sions to ration care.
The frequency and sophistication of these challenges has 
increased since the 1990s because of the rapid increase 
in the number of public, quasi-public, and nonprofit 
organizations that use evidence-based health research 
to inform their recommendations. This growing use of 
evidence-based health research followed the advances in 
methodology summarized above. These advances influ-
enced governance because they coincided with the dismay 
of many policy makers and employers about increasing 
expenditures for health care. The first project to use 
systematic reviews to evaluate an entire area of health 
services published its results in 1989 (14). The Cochrane 
Collaboration, organized in 1993, has established an 
international process for improving the standards and 
methods of systematic reviews. It also created, enlarged, 
and sustained an international community of reviewers.
The standards set by most of the review organizations 
threaten manufacturers and their allies in the supply 
chain, as well as many researchers, because they address 
sources of systematic bias in conducting and reporting 
research. For example, the review organizations’ stan-
dards for disclosing and avoiding conflict of interest are 
often higher than those of most universities and funders of 
primary studies. Many review organizations also require 
that evidence submitted to them by industry be made 
publicly available.
Despite considerable opposition, evidence is accumulat-
ing that policy created on the basis of the work of orga-
nizations that conduct and assess systematic reviews of 
prescription drugs and other interventions is improving 
the quality of care and containing growth in spending. 
The application of science-based regulatory standards 
shifts market share, often drastically, to the most effective 
interventions.
Some public review organizations in the United States 
and other countries also evaluate interventions to prevent 
disease and address determinants of health other than 
care. The United States Preventive Services Task Force 
systematically reviews evidence of effectiveness and issues 
recommendations. The Guide to Community Preventive 
Services of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
commissions systematic reviews of interventions to 
improve population health but does not recommend policy. 
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The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) in the United Kingdom has published public 
health “guidance” based on evidence reviews for interven-
tions that have recently included behavior change, com-
munity engagement, social and emotional well-being in 
primary education, and promoting physical activity. Policy 
makers have recently asked a few review organizations to 
recommend the reallocation of resources from ineffective 
services to address determinants of health other than care. 
Such public discussion has occurred — and generated con-
troversy in governance — in Australia, England, France, 
and Spain (15).
The changes in governance that have raised eviden-
tiary standards for policy for health care and population 
health are a result of the gradual redistribution of power. 
Redistribution is occurring because of growing agreement 
on 2 points among many leaders of government, business, 
the health professions, and the media: 1) that the rate 
at which spending for health care has been increasing is 
unsustainable and 2) that much care is ineffective, unnec-
essary, or harmful. This agreement is reflected in changes 
in governance that are mitigating political barriers to 
higher evidentiary standards for the coverage of health 
services (eg, the sections on comparative effectiveness 
research in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
of 2010 in the United States) (16,17). These barriers are, 
however, still daunting.
Standards for Health in the Governance of 
Foreign Affairs
Improving health has become a funded rather than 
symbolic goal of foreign and national security policy 
since the late 1990s. The US Central Intelligence Agency 
reported in 1998 that high infant mortality was a signifi-
cant predictor of the failure of states. During the second 
Clinton Administration, the National Security Council 
for the first time assigned a staff member to address 
issues in global health. In 2001, a new secretary of state, 
Colin Powell, appointed the first assistant secretary of 
state for health. Ambassadors rather than aid officials 
in Washington and low-income countries administered 
the President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) enacted in 2003. A committee of the Institute 
of Medicine recommended that the incoming Obama 
administration “highlight health as a pillar of US foreign 
policy.” The United States and other donor countries 
increased spending for health by more than 600% during 
the past 2 decades (18-20).
The salience of health as an aspect of foreign affairs 
increased without changes in governance as substantial 
as those that have occurred in decision making for health 
care. Policy makers for health in foreign affairs and their 
allies outside government have often refused or been reluc-
tant to apply findings from research on the effectiveness of 
interventions. Some opposition to applying the findings of 
independent research is ideological (eg, advocates of absti-
nence-only programs to prevent HIV infection) or com-
mercial (eg, resistance from pharmaceutical companies to 
purchasing generic drugs with PEPFAR funds).
Many experts on international health and their allies in 
government have also resisted applying the best available 
findings from research. Following are some examples from 
my experience. A Washington-based nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) appointed an internationally promi-
nent systematic reviewer as its director of research and 
then denied him access to its grant funds from the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation. Leaders of health-related 
NGOs from many countries opposed a recommendation 
by a work group of the Council on Foreign Relations 
that PEPFAR take account of findings from systematic 
reviews (21). The first administrator of PEPFAR in the 
US Department of State and the program’s chief physician 
met with the authors of the recommendation but declined 
to accept it. As a participant in these events, I speculated 
that this resistance to the best evidence was about pro-
tecting territory: for NGO leaders, access to and approval 
by funders in government and foundations; for PEPFAR 
officials, to avoid collaborating with and perhaps fund-
ing federal agencies that sponsor research that evaluates 
interventions to improve health.
The World Health Organization (WHO) endorses sys-
tematic reviews but has been ambivalent about using 
them to set standards for policy. WHO’s Model Lists of 
Essential Medicines and its program on maternal and 
child health rely on reviews published by the Cochrane 
Collaboration. However, WHO continues to recommend 
Directly Observed Therapy/Short Course (DOTS) for treat-
ing tuberculosis despite trials and systematic reviews that 
find it is not the most effective intervention (22).
Several countries and private organizations are, how-
ever, applying standards in global health similar to those 
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that are becoming conventional in the governance of 
domestic policy for health care. The chief medical officer 
of the Department of Health in the United Kingdom, for 
example, leads a “government-wide global strategy” for 
health that includes using the research and standard-set-
ting expertise of the National Health Service, the Health 
Protection Agency, and NICE (23,24). Similarly, leading 
foundations and multinational organizations in global 
health evince increased interest in evidence from indepen-
dent research. The governance of health as an aspect of 
foreign affairs may be changing.
Conclusion
The use of evidence from research to set standards and 
inform policy has had a different history in health care, 
especially in making decisions about coverage, than in 
health as an aspect of foreign policy. In health care, findings 
from research in laboratory, clinical, and community set-
tings have been prominent in governance of the allocation of 
resources and of accountability for more than a century.
In the governance of foreign policy, in contrast, find-
ings from formal research have almost always been sub-
ordinate to ideology, commercial interests, and threats 
to international and homeland security. Participants in 
governance often have substantial reasons to subsidize 
and placate leaders of countries that have dysfunctional 
health systems. Policy makers for health care, unlike their 
counterparts in foreign policy, work in the context of high 
public expectations that interventions will have measur-
able benefits for people and populations.
Proponents of science-based standards in the gover-
nance of both health care and health as a factor in foreign 
policy have experienced less resistance to establishing 
such standards for health services than for socioeconomic 
and behavioral determinants of health. Evidence has 
accumulated about the effects on health status of alter-
native policies for income maintenance, education, social 
services, and the environment. But improving health is 
hardly ever the highest priority of leading participants 
in the governance of these areas of policy, at home or in 
other countries. Calculations of potential net improvement 
in population health status over time are likely to remain 
secondary to immediate economic and political concerns.
However, recent research on the economics of governance 
suggests that it is possible and desirable to make policy 
that addresses broad determinants of health and to do so 
for both domestic and foreign policy. In his presidential 
address to the American Economic Association in 2009, 
Avinash Dixit described the benefits of governance that 
promotes well-being in a country or region. Such gover-
nance “enabl[es] the growth of income and globaliz[es] 
the enlargement and stability of the middle class.” These 
benefits justify higher standards for population health to 
inform “collective action” in the “provision of public goods 
and the control of public ‘bads’” (25). Other economists 
argue that effective incentives for such collective goods 
exist “outside the standard private goods model” (26).
Moreover, evidence exists that policy has improved pop-
ulation health indirectly, thus avoiding some resistance 
to making changes in governance to set higher standards 
for interventions. For example, strong evidence exists that 
population health in industrial countries improved since 
the early 19th century, mainly as a result of increased 
public spending for health, housing, and social services 
combined with taxes that encouraged capital investment 
and, by taxing consumption, discouraged behavior linked 
to poor health and premature death (27).
The history of governance in each of the areas of policy 
discussed in this article offers lessons for improving popu-
lation health. The lesson from the governance of health 
care is that governance can be politically feasible for policy 
makers to establish science-based standards for policy and 
create organizations to conduct and assess research effec-
tively. The lesson from the governance of foreign policy 
is that it can contribute to improving health even when 
it rejects standards on the basis of the best available evi-
dence. The broadest lesson from the analysis in this article 
is that governance, in all its complexity, is the principal 
determinant of policy.
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